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The prospects for the EU-Ukraine free trade agreement 
Rafal Sadowski
The European Union and Ukraine initialled the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area 
Agreement (DCFTA) on 19 July 2012. The scope of the agreement which the EU and Ukraine 
reached following their negotiations is much more extensive than that of a typical free trade 
agreement. It envisages not only the lifting of tariff and extra-tariff barriers but also, more 
importantly, Kyiv adopting EU legal solutions and standards in this area. 
Whether the agreement will be signed and implemented is still an open question and depends 
on the existing political conditions. On the one hand, the repression imposed by the govern-
ment in Kyiv on its political opponents (including the detention of the former prime minister, 
Yulia Tymoshenko) has provoked criticism from the EU, which refuses to sign the agreement 
if the government in Kyiv continues to violate democratic principles. The manner in which 
Ukraine’s parliamentary elections are conducted this October will be the key test. On the 
other hand, Russia is increasingly active in its efforts to involve Ukraine in the integration pro-
jects it has initiated (the Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic Community). It should be 
noted that Moscow has effective instruments to exert its will, such as the dependence of the 
Ukrainian economy on supplies of Russian oil and gas and on exports to the Russian market. 
Besides, Moscow also has political instruments at its disposal. 
It is impossible to participate in integration projects both with the EU and with Russia. 
Therefore, Kyiv will have to make a strategic decision and choose the direction of its economic 
integration. Unless Ukraine takes concrete action to implement its agreements with the EU, 
primarily including the free trade agreement, its economic dependence on Russia will grow, 
and it will be more likely to join the Russian integration projects. 
The DCFTA as an instrument of EU policy
The signing of the Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Area Agreement marked the end 
of the procedure of initialling the Association 
Agreement between Ukraine and the EU1. 
The DCFTA is based on two key elements. 
Firstly, it envisages a liberalisation of trade 
through lifting customs tariffs, import quotas 
and other barriers (legal, technical and proce-
1 The negotiations of the two agreements ended in De-
cember 2011, and the Association Agreement and the 
first and the last pages of the DCFTA Agreement were 
initialled on 30 March 2012.
dural) to trade. The agreement also states that 
Kyiv will liberalise regulations on investments 
and services. Secondly, Ukraine undertakes to 
adopt EU laws, norms and standards concern-
ing trade under the agreement. 
The EU’s priorities in the negotiations concern-
ing the free trade area with Ukraine primarily in-
cluded: (1) Ukraine’s closer integration with the 
European market, aimed at improving its politi-
cal and economic stability; and (2) securing the 
interests of EU firms and investors by opening 
up and liberalising the Ukrainian market, and its 
adjustment to the European model.
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The DCFTA is seen as one of the key instruments 
in Ukraine’s European integration. However, 
this integration is not understood as offering 
a perspective of membership, but as Ukraine’s 
adjustment to the European model, which is 
expected to ensure stability in the EU’s imme-
diate neighbourhood. The potential economic 
and business benefits resulting from the cre-
ation of the free trade area are expected to 
serve as an incentive for Kyiv to take effective 
actions to bring the country closer to the EU. 
However, the implementation of the Action 
Plans as part of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy – and since 2009 of the Association Agen-
da – has not led to deeper integration2. Unlike 
the preceding instruments aimed at bringing 
Ukraine closer to the EU (the Partnership and 
Co-operation Agreement, the Action Plans and 
the Association Agenda – see Appendix 2), 
this one introduces mechanisms aimed at mo-
bilising Kyiv more strongly to make real pro-
gress with Ukraine’s European integration. 
The agreement includes a precise schedule 
for implementing solutions and adopting leg-
islation. Ukraine is also obliged to adjust its 
legislation on a current basis to any future 
amendments of EU law, and has no influence 
whatsoever on the form of such amendments. 
Should any of the parties fail to comply with the 
agreement’s provisions, security mechanisms 
have been introduced, including the suspen-
sion of preferences applied, the primary goal of 
which is to provide the EU with more options 
to apply pressure on Ukraine. Instruments of di-
alogue have also been developed, which may 
contribute to a more effective stimulation of 
Ukraine’s European integration. Plans have been 
made to establish a number of expert commit-
tees as part of the DCFTA. They will deal with 
2 Katarzyna Pelczynska-Nalecz, ‘Integration or imitation? 
EU policy towards its Eastern Neighbours’, OSW Stud-
ies, 2011, http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/
PRACE_36_en.pdf
 Julia Langbein, Kataryna Wolczuk, ‘Convergence with-
out membership? The impact of the European Union in 
the neighbourhood: evidence from Ukraine’, Journal of 
European Public Policy, 2011.
issues regarding co-operation in individual are-
as of the free trade area’s operation (including 
sectoral co-operation, customs co-operation, 
sustainable development, trade facilitations 
and sanitary and phytosanitary standards). 
The issues which are important from the point 
of view of EU member states include improving 
the security of European investments and facil-
itations for doing business in Ukraine. Econom-
ic integration as part of the DCFTA is expect-
ed to lead to the creation of similar conditions 
for doing business for both EU and Ukrainian 
firms. This will be built on the foundation of the 
regulations and solutions applicable in the EU. 
As a consequence of removing the mechanisms 
devised to protect Ukrainian firms and of the 
introduction of equal conditions for doing busi-
ness on the basis of EU legislation, firms from 
EU member states may gain advantage over 
their Ukrainian competitors. At the same time, 
in areas where Ukrainian producers might pose 
a challenge to the interests of EU-based enti-
ties (for example in agriculture), the European 
Union has upheld the mechanisms which re-
strict the competition they offer, and has pre-
served the import quotas. Another measure 
used to secure the interests of EU producers is 
the protection of intellectual property rights 
(including trademarks and geographical marks). 
Special procedures for dispute resolution have 
also been introduced. They will offer better 
protection than now for the rights of EU mem-
ber states and companies operating in Ukraine 
(and vice versa).
Economic integration as part of the DCFTA 
is expected to lead to the creation of sim-
ilar conditions for doing business for both 
EU and Ukrainian firms. This will be built 
on the foundation of the regulations and 
solutions applicable in the EU.
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The economic impact
From the economic point of view, the imple-
mentation of the DCFTA agreement will primar-
ily be significant for Ukraine. This is due to the 
huge disproportion existing between these two 
markets – the EU with 500 million consumers, 
the world’s largest market, the nominal value of 
whose GDP in 2011 reached US$17.6 trillion on 
the one hand, and the Ukrainian market, which 
is less than one-tenth times the size in terms of 
the number of consumers, and which generat-
ed a GDP at a level of US$165 billion (54th in the 
world)3. Economic co-operation is much more 
important for Ukraine than it is for the EU. 
While for Ukraine the European Union is the 
second largest trade partner after Russia 
(in 2010, the EU accounted for 28.6% of the trade), 
Ukraine is of secondary importance for the EU 
(being only the 22nd largest trade partner, with 
a share of 1.1% in trade)4. To a great extent, 
Kyiv had to accept the conditions set by the EU 
in the DCFTA; the room for negotiation was 
limited. The implementation of this agreement, 
which provides for part of the acquis commu-
nautaire to be adopted by Ukraine and the lib-
eralisation of trade and investment regulations, 
will not bring any changes into EU legislation. 
The agreement will have an impact not only on 
3 According to data from the International Monetary Fund 
for 2011, the nominal GDP value of all EU member states 
reached US$17.6 trillion, and the four largest national econ-
omies were as follows: 1. the USA with US$15.1 trillion, 
2. China with US$7.3 trillion, 3. Japan with US$5.9 trillion 
and 4. Germany with US$3.6 trillion; http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/01/weodata/index.aspx
4 Data on the basis of information from the Directorate 
General for Trade (as quoted by Eurostat and the IMF) 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/
tradoc_113459.pdf
the trade co-operation between Ukraine and 
the EU, but also on the operation of Ukraine’s 
entire internal market5.
The estimates published so far, based on the 
calculations made according to the computa-
ble general equilibrium model6, point to a po-
tential increase in cumulative welfare gains7 
for Ukraine in the long term at a rate between 
4% and 11%8. In turn, in the case of the EU, 
this indicator will not exceed 1%9. However, 
it has to be emphasised that these calculations 
are based on a model which does not consider 
a number of essential factors (for example, 
the impact of the crisis in the eurozone, or 
possible changes in Ukraine’s political and eco-
nomic situation), or certain details of the provi-
sions under the DCFTA agreement. Therefore, 
they can only be interpreted as indications of 
a potential trend in the change of the situation, 
and not as an accurate forecast of change. 
There is no comprehensive evaluation of the 
impact the implementation of the DCFTA 
agreement will have on individual sectors of 
the economy. Those analyses which have been 
5 Iana Dreyer, ‘Trade Policy in the EU’s Neighbourhood’, 
Notre Europe, 2012.
6 Computable general equilibrium model (CGE) – an eco-
nomic model which on the basis of current economic 
data estimates the impact of selected factors (political, 
technological, legislation changes, etc.) on changes 
in the economy. 
7 So-called cumulative welfare gains: this indicator eval-
uates the level of social welfare depending on actions 
taken as part of public intervention (for example, social 
benefits resulting from trade policy).
8 Marek Dabrowski, Svitlana Taran, ‘Is Free Trade with 
the EU good for Ukraine?’, CASE Network E-briefs, 
no. 06/2012, March 2012.
 Veronika Movchan, Volodymyr Shportyuk, ‘Between 
two unions: optimal regional integration strategy for 
Ukraine’, 13th Annual Conference of the European Trade 
Study Group, Copenhagen, August 2011.
 ECORYS, Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment for the 
FTA between the EU and Ukraine within the Enhanced 
Agreement, Report for the European Commission DG 
Trade, December 2007.
9 The data published by Veronika Movchan and Volody-
myr Shportyuk, which already took into account the 
change in the Ukrainian tariffs following accession to 
the WTO, indicated that welfare gains in Ukraine would 
increase by 4.3% in the short term and by 11.8% in the 
long term. Veronika Movchan, Volodymyr Shportyuk, 
‘Between two unions: optimal regional integration 
strategy for Ukraine’, 13th Annual Conference of the Eu-
ropean Trade Study Group, Copenhagen, August 2011.
From the economic point of view, the im-
plementation of the DCFTA agreement will 
primarily be significant for Ukraine, due to 
the huge disproportion existing between 
these two markets.
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published have considered Ukraine only par-
tially, while the impact on the individual sec-
tors of the EU market has not been examined. 
According to the estimates presented so far, 
the branches of the Ukrainian economy which 
could benefit from the agreement in the long 
term include the clothing, wood, metallurgical, 
food (food production) and machine-building 
industries. In turn, the agriculture, service and 
light manufacturing sectors may face a decrease 
in income. However, the evaluations in this con-
text vary. For example, agriculture is mentioned 
among the sectors which will lose most10, while 
some simulations indicate that food manufac-
turers could increase their incomes by €393 mil-
lion in Ukraine and €860 million in the EU11. 
The potential benefits for Ukraine…
Lifting the customs tariffs alone, without 
a deep and comprehensive legislative harmoni-
sation, would have had a much weaker impact 
on the Ukrainian economy, given the trade pref-
erences the EU has already granted to Ukraine 
(as part of the WTO and the Generalised System 
of Preferences; for more details, see Appendix 2) 
and the relatively low customs tariffs. Econom-
ic integration with the European Union poten-
tially offers Ukraine access to the EU market, 
and may also provide it with greater opportu-
nities for extending its exports to global mar-
kets (partly owing to the adoption of the EU 
standards in production and services). At the 
same time, this will boost competitiveness on 
the domestic market, which will be beneficial 
to Ukrainian consumers. 
The legislative harmonisation with the EU will 
bring about a better operation of the Ukrain-
ian legal system and will also curb corruption. 
10 Michael Emerson ed., ‘The Prospect Of Deep Free Trade 
Between The European Union And Ukraine’, Centre for 
European Policy Studies, Brussels 2006, pp. 213.
11 Olexandr Nekhay, Stephan Hubertus Gay, Thomas Fell-
mann, ‘A Free Trade Agreement between Ukraine and 
the European Union: Challenges and Opportunities 
for Agricultural Markets’, EAAE 2011 Congress, Zurich, 
2011, pp. 8.
It may also lead to an improvement in the busi-
ness climate, and thus create more opportuni-
ties to gain access to new sources of financing 
(including foreign direct investments and for-
eign loans; the loan costs will also be reduced). 
The transfer of new technologies and manage-
ment methods will improve production effi-
ciency and quality. The improvement of invest-
ing conditions is essential because Ukraine has 
been evaluated as the country with the worst 
business climate in Eastern Europe12 and with 
the highest level of corruption13. The European 
Union is one of Ukraine’s most important trad-
ing partners, and investments from EU member 
states clearly predominate among the foreign 
direct investments: in 2010, their share reached 
78.8%14.
The increasing competition from EU-based firms 
may also turn out to be an effective stimulus 
for the Ukrainian economy to undergo reforms 
and modernisation. One example may be the 
need to improve energy efficiency, and thus to 
reduce the production costs of Ukrainian firms 
so they can come up against the competition 
12 In the 2012 Doing Business ranking, which examines the 
conditions for doing business, Ukraine was ranked 152nd 
out of the 183 countries in the world, the lowest in East-
ern Europe, http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings
13 In Transparency International’s corruption perception 
ranking for 2011, Ukraine was ranked 152nd out of the 
182 countries in the world; this being the lowest po-
sition in Eastern Europe, http://cpi.transparency.org/
cpi2011/results/
14 Data provided by the State Statistical Service of Ukraine 
(Ukrstat). However, it should be noted that firms regis-
tered in Cyprus accounted for the largest share of invest-
ments (28.1%), which means that Ukrainian and Russian 
capital is being reinvested. Nevertheless, these firms are 
operating according to EU law. 
The improvement of investing conditions, 
which the DCFTA is aimed to stimulate, is 
essential because Ukraine has been eval-
uated as the country with the worst busi-
ness climate in Eastern Europe and with 
the highest level of corruption. 
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offered by EU-based firms. Other examples may 
be the reduction of dependence on oil and gas 
imports, and the diversification of the sources 
of economic growth, which now relies on large 
raw-material corporations (for example, from 
the metallurgical sector), through the develop-
ment of other branches of the economy, such 
as the service sector and the small- and medi-
um-sized businesses sector. 
…and the real challenges
However, implementing the DCFTA entails 
a need to make a great administrative effort 
(in connection with the implementation of the 
acquis communautaire) and to spend the funds 
(by the state and firms alike). The Ukrainian gov-
ernment has not as yet publicised the precise and 
total costs of implementing the agreement15. 
The increase in production costs resulting from 
the introduction of EU standards may make 
Ukrainian entities less competitive at the ini-
tial stage of the agreement’s implementation. 
This will be primarily a challenge for small and 
medium firms, some of which may face bank-
ruptcy. The large corporations controlled by 
Ukrainian oligarchs will be affected less; these 
export their products to the EU market because 
they have already taken actions to adapt to EU 
standards (for example, production and eco-
logical standards). However, this is not linked to 
the adoption of the DCFTA, but to their activity 
on the European market16. 
The EU’s offer, which could compensate for 
the costs incurred by Ukraine, is rather limited. 
Apart from the potential benefits in the long 
term, which have not been precisely defined, 
no short-term benefits have been clearly in-
15 Some fairly general cost estimates have already been 
published by various research centres, such as ‘Costs 
and Benefits of FTA between Ukraine and the European 
Union’, Institute for Economic Research and Policy Con-
sulting, Kyiv, 2010.
16 Kateryna Zarembo, ‘EU-Ukraine DCFTA: What do oli-
garchs think?’, Institute of World Policy, Policy Brief no. 
1/2012.
dicated. The Association Agreement and the 
DCFTA do not envisage any significant increase 
in financial or technical support from the EU 
in addition to what has already been offered 
as part of the Eastern Partnership, the Europe-
an Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, 
and other EU facilities (for example, the pro-
grammes of the European Investment Bank and 
the EBRD). At the same time, it is now uncertain 
whether the EU will be able to offer more aid 
in the future, due to the eurozone crisis, and 
the desire of some member states to cut the 
European Union’s spending (especially as the 
Eastern Partnership is not a high priority for 
the EU member states). Ukraine may also have 
problems with the costs of implementation of 
the DCFTA, due to mounting economic prob-
lems and the slowdown in economic growth 
(according to the IMF’s estimates, Ukraine’s 
GDP in 2012 will grow by 3.0%, while in 2011 it 
grew by 5.2%17; in the first half of 2012 indus-
trial production increased by as little as 0.7%). 
Integrating the Ukrainian economy with the 
large and competitive EU market requires polit-
ical will and a far-reaching vision. Kyiv will find 
it challenging to cope with the strong compe-
tition and use its emerging opportunities by 
developing new sectors. One example may be 
the IT service outsourcing sector, where exports 
in 2011 reached the value of US$1 billion and 
annual growth was between 30–40% (the sale 
17 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook: 
Coping with High Debt and Sluggish Growth, October 
2012, pp. 79.
Implementing the DCFTA could bring 
Ukraine potential benefits in the long 
term, which however requires it to in-
cur significant costs now. In turn, for the 
Ukrainian political elite, the most impor-
tant thing are temporary political and 
economic profits.
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of exports in this sector was higher than that 
of weapon exports, which traditionally gener-
ate high profits)18.
However, an essential discrepancy in the expec-
tations and interests is emerging between Kyiv 
and Brussels. Implementing the DCFTA could 
bring Ukraine potential benefits in the long 
term, which however requires it to incur signif-
icant costs now. In turn, for the Ukrainian po-
litical elite, the most important thing are tem-
porary political and economic profits, which 
the implementation of the agreement does 
not guarantee. Ukraine is also becoming more 
sceptical due to the uncertainty about which 
direction the EU will be developing in regarding 
the crisis in the eurozone. The lack of any pros-
pect of membership is also frequently raised. 
Some ask what the point is in implementing 
a significant part of the EU acquis if Ukraine will 
not have any influence on its form and will not 
be able to benefit fully from it. 
The political background
From the Ukrainian government’s point of view, 
the implementation of the DCFTA agreement is 
not connected with any tangible current polit-
ical benefits. The top priority issues at this mo-
ment for Kyiv are the upcoming parliamentary 
elections and vying with the opposition on the 
internal political scene. European integration, 
including the free trade zone, are not seen as 
the most important issues by Ukrainian voters. 
For this reason, whether the Association Agree-
ment is signed or not will not have any major 
impact on the outcome of the election or on 
the internal political competition. Besides, it is 
the present cabinet led by Mykola Azarov who 
can take the credit for accelerating and final-
ising these negotiations. The previous govern-
ments, including the Yulia Tymoshenko cabinet, 
were unsuccessful with this. 
18 Graham Stack, ‘Tapping Ukraine’s IT potential’, Financial 
Times beyondbrics, 22 August 2012, http://blogs.ft.com/
beyond-brics/2012/08/22/tapping-ukraines-it-outsourc-
ing-potential/#axzz24MArDC9C
The Ukrainian government initialled the DCF-
TA because it wants to continue the dialogue 
with the European Union and to avoid isolation, 
even though mutual relations are worsening 
due to the continued imprisonment of Yulia 
Tymoshenko, a former prime minister and op-
position leader, as well as the violation of dem-
ocratic standards in Ukraine. A failure of the 
negotiations or withdrawal from the implemen-
tation of the agreement would mean a break-
down of the process of integration with the EU. 
This could have serious geopolitical consequenc-
es for Kyiv and would significantly weaken its 
position in dealings with Russia, which desires to 
strengthen its influence in Ukraine. The gestures 
which suggest engagement in the European in-
tegration process are an attempt at breaking 
the political deadlock in relations with the EU. 
The Ukrainian government put the negotiations 
concerning the DCFTA agreement on a faster 
track at the beginning of 2011; owing to this, 
it was possible to conclude the negotiations in 
December 2011. The fact that on 20 March 2012 
the Ukrainian parliament adopted a resolution 
to implement the DCFTA agreement as soon 
as possible, immediately after its signing and 
before its ratification (which is admissible under 
EU law) – upon the initiative of the ruling Party 
of Regions – can be seen in the same context. 
At the same time, despite the crisis in political 
relations, Ukraine has been gradually carrying 
out its tasks set under the Association Agenda. 
A failure of the negotiations or withdraw-
al from the implementation of the agree-
ment would mean a breakdown of the 
process of integration with the EU. This 
could have serious geopolitical conse-
quences for Kyiv and would significantly 
weaken its position in dealings with Rus-
sia, which desires to strengthen its influ-
ence in Ukraine. 
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While regress has been observed in the areas 
of political reforms and democracy19, moderate 
progress has been seen in the economy and 
sectoral reforms (42 of the 48 priorities set for 
2011–2012 are being implemented, 3 have been 
completed and 3 have not been carried out)20. 
However, this does not mean that the Ukraini-
an government is fully engaged in introducing 
EU regulations. Kyiv often disregards the EU’s 
stance when it is at variance with the interests 
of local lobbies. For example, on 1 August 2012, 
President Viktor Yanukovych signed a law un-
der which the obligation to hold tenders for the 
purchase of goods and service was lifted from 
state-controlled companies in cases where they 
purchase these using their own funds. This deci-
sion has been criticised by the EU as contrary to 
the provisions of the Association Agreement21. 
Another factor which undermines the Ukrain-
ian government’s will to implement the DCF-
TA is the deteriorating economic situation in 
Ukraine. To protect its own market and increase 
budget revenues, the Ukrainian government in 
mid-September this year notified the WTO’s 
 
19 Звіт № 4 за результатами Громадського моніторингу 
виконання пріоритетів Порядку денного асоціації 
Україна – ЄС (січень-вересень 2011 року), Громадський 
моніторинг Порядку денного асоціації Україна-ЄС, 
2011, http://www.ucipr.kiev.ua/files/books/Report4_
monitoring_PDA%28Jan-Sep2011%29.pdf
20 Виконання Порядку денного асоціації Україна – ЄС: 
чи є прогрес у секторальних реформах?, Інституту 
економічних досліджень та політичних консультацій 
(ІЕД), 2012, http://www.ier.com.ua/files/Public_
events/2012/AA_Economy_Nov2011_May2012_Report_
IER_ukr.pdf
21 Dmytro Shurkhalo, ‘Влада виправдовує «тінізацію» 
держзакупівель турботою про держпідприємства’, 
Radio Svaboda, 16 August 2012, http://www.radio-
svoboda.org/content/article/24679447.html
members of its intention to raise customs tar-
iffs on over 350 goods22. The EU has voiced con-
cerns that this decision could affect its exports 
to Ukraine, and is contrary to the guidelines of 
the free trade agreement. 
Although the Ukrainian government has de-
clared that it will grant high priority to inte-
gration with the EU, Kyiv has been trying to 
conduct a policy of balance between Brussels 
and Moscow, and win benefits from both sides. 
This policy is primarily aimed at achieving short-
term results and not long-term goals. Russia 
has been increasing the pressure on Ukraine to 
join the reintegration projects it has initiated 
in the former USSR: the Customs Union and, 
in the longer term, the Eurasian Economic 
Community. Moscow has strong instruments 
of influence, principally Ukraine’s dependence 
on oil and gas supplies from, and exports to, 
the Russian market. Kyiv is making efforts to 
renegotiate its unfavourable gas contract and 
reduce the gas price (which is one of the highest 
in Europe). In an attempt to capitalise on this, 
Russia is threatening to take retaliatory action 
if Kyiv joins the free trade area with the EU, and 
Ukraine will suffer economic losses as a con-
sequence. Moscow has also been pressing on 
Ukraine to withhold carrying out its obligations 
as part of the Energy Community, which envis-
age the adoption of EU directives concerning 
the gas sector, electric power, renewable ener-
gy and environmental protection23. Although 
the Association Agreement and the DCFTA are 
separate from the Energy Community agree-
ments, the provisions of the DCFTA include 
references to the provisions and actions being 
implemented as part of the Energy Community. 
22 Formally, Ukraine has announced the launch of the pro-
cedure to renegotiate the customs duty rates agreed 
within the WTO. It has also assured that the EU’s in-
terests will not be affected, and the customs duty rate 
changes will not apply to trade with the EU. 
23 For more on Ukraine’s engagement in co-operation as 
part of the Energy Community see: Wojciech Kononczuk, 
Slawomir Matuszak, ‘Ukraine & Moldova and the Ener-
gy Community’, OSW, EastWeek, 28 March 2012, http://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2012-03-28/
ukraine-moldova-and-energy-community
If political relations with Brussels further 
deteriorate, it cannot be ruled out that Kyiv 
will redefine the vectors of its economic 
policy and choose closer co-operation 
with Russia.
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Ukraine’s possible withdrawal from the Energy 
Community will not formally mean a suspen-
sion of the DCFTA implementation, because 
these are two separate legal acts. However, 
if Kyiv took such a decision, it would face polit-
ical consequences; it would mean the failure of 
the energy integration programme, and would 
call into question Ukraine’s will to implement 
the provisions of the Association Agreement 
and the free trade agreement, and thus its de-
sire for European integration.
Ukraine is not interested in participating in 
Russian integration projects as yet. However, 
as political relations with Brussels deteriorate, 
it cannot be ruled out that Kyiv will redefine 
the vectors of its economic policy and choose 
closer co-operation with Russia. More and 
more opinions can be heard which are critical 
of integration with the EU and opt for improv-
ing co-operation with Russia, one example of 
which is the intensifying political activity of Vik-
tor Medvedchuk, the former head of Kuchma’s 
presidential administration24.
24 Viktor Medvedchuk’s interview for Glavcom portal, 
12 July 2012, http://glavcom.ua/articles/7597.html
What next for the DCFTA?
The initialling of the entire DCFTA document, 
which has gone almost unnoticed, technically 
ends one stage in the negotiations on the As-
sociation Agreement. Before the agreement 
comes into effect, it must be signed and then 
ratified. Some member states are pressing the 
Commission to enable temporary implemen-
tation of the DCFTA after it has been signed 
(which is possible within a timeframe of be-
tween one and two years) but before its rati-
fication (which can take place within three or 
four years at the earliest). However, EU-Ukraine 
relations are deadlocked now due to the deten-
tion of Yulia Tymoshenko. The future of the As-
sociation Agreement of the DCFTA will strongly 
depend on how the parliamentary elections in 
Ukraine, which are scheduled for 28 October, 
proceed; the EU will not take any strategic deci-
sions before then. If the Ukrainian government 
continues to violate democratic standards, 
the European Union’s consent to the implemen-
tation of the DFCTA will be very unlikely.
The DCFTA guidelines
- lifting customs tariffs (import and export) 
on goods manufactured in the EU and Ukraine
In the case of some goods, tariff reduction is to 
be carried out gradually within a timeframe of 
up to ten years. Ukraine has maintained the op-
tion to use protection mechanisms on certain 
conditions within fifteen years of the beginning 
of the agreement’s implementation, includ-
ing imposing export duty on certain goods or 
keeping higher import duty on selected goods 
(for example, cars). 
- removal of technical barriers to trade 
and import restrictions (with the exceptions 
admissible under the GATT25 rules)
The EU has maintained quotas in the case of 
some agricultural and food products import-
ed from Ukraine (for example, meat and dairy 
products), and Ukraine has done likewise for 
those imported from the EU (for example, pork, 
poultry and sugar).
25 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
APPENDIX 1
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- Ukraine’s adopting EU regulations, stand-
ards and laws in the area of trade
The agreement includes a schedule for adopting 
individual EU regulations, including those con-
cerning sanitary and phytosanitary measures, 
technical regulations, customs procedures, in-
vestment law and the rules for operation of for-
eign companies, competition rules, state aid to 
business entities, principles which regulate the 
operation of some branches of the service sec-
tor, including financial services, telecommunica-
tion, maritime transport, postal services, etc. 
- introducing the same rules for trade be-
tween the EU and Ukraine as those existing 
between the EU member states
These issues are to be regulated under the Agree-
ment on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance 
of Industrial Products (ACAA)26, which is to be 
attached to the DCFTA as an additional protocol. 
In the case of Ukraine, the ACAA is intended to 
cover selected branches of the industry (but not 
the entire economy), and envisages the adjust-
ment of Ukrainian technical and infrastructural 
regulations and standards to EU legislation. 
- equal conditions for doing business for 
business entities
Each party is to ensure the freedom to do busi-
ness for companies from the other party oper-
ating in its area on the same terms as enjoyed 
by its own companies, and to refrain from 
discriminatory practices, with the exception 
of certain sectors (including mining, the arms 
industry, and maritime and air transport). This 
also concerns public procurement, where both 
parties are expected to treat business entities 
as their own, and Ukraine is supposed to gradu-
ally adjust its regulations to those applicable in 
the EU. At the same time, Ukrainian regulations 
26 Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance 
of Industrial Products. Although Ukraine has promised 
since 2005 to enter into this agreement and to imple-
ment its provisions, it has made rather limited progress 
in the negotiations and the adoption of its guidelines. 
concerning the flow of capital and investments 
are to be liberalised. 
- protection of intellectual property rights 
and geographical indication 
The list of protected names of goods includes 
approximately 3000 products from the EU 
(for example, cognac and champagne) and ap-
proximately 100 from Ukraine.
- dispute settlement procedures
These should have a greater influence than be-
fore on the other party in cases where provisions 
of the agreement are breached, and also in cas-
es when the rights of entrepreneurs operating 
on the other party’s market are violated. This is 
a serious problem now, especially with regard 
to securing the rights of firms from EU member 
states operating on the Ukrainian market. 
- the energy sector
The free trade agreement refers to a smaller 
extent to energy co-operation, the basis for 
which is the agreements concluded as part of 
Energy Community. The DCFTA is primarily fo-
cused on issues concerning trade in energy and 
raw energy materials (setting prices, customs 
duties, infrastructural co-operation, and the 
transit and transport of energy). It is assumed 
that Ukraine will liberalise its energy prices. 
The provision-setting guarantees for the secure 
transit of energy raw materials are vital for the 
EU. Ukraine has undertaken to improve its own 
gas transit regulations. However, the provision on 
safe transit will have limited consequences, since 
none of the parties is able to influence the ac-
tions taken by third parties – in this case Russia, 
which is the key supplier of the oil and gas which 
are transported to the EU through Ukraine. 
- the dialogue instruments
The agreement provides for the establishment 
of export committees and dialogue forums to 
handle individual areas of co-operation covered 
by the DCFTA.
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EU-Ukraine trade relations
EU-Ukraine trade relations are now based on 
the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement 
(PCA), which was signed in 1994 and came 
into force in 1998. Among other things, it pro-
vides for lifting limitations for preferential trade 
(including the use of discriminative tariffs and 
import quotas) and bringing Ukrainian leg-
islation closer to the rules of the EU’s com-
mon market. The European Union also grant-
ed Ukraine ‘most favoured nation’ status27, 
as a consequence of which it received prefer-
ences similar to those the EU granted to the 
member states of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO). In 1993, Ukraine was included in the 
EU’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), 
which made it easier for developing countries 
to export some categories of goods to the EU 
market28. It is worth mentioning at this point 
that other eastern partners were offered more 
favourable trade conditions over time. For in-
stance, Moldova was covered by Autonomous 
Trade Preferences (ATP), which lifted EU cus-
toms duty on almost all goods with the excep-
tion of some agricultural and food products. 
In turn, the Southern Caucasian countries were 
covered by the GSP+ system, which set the cus-
toms tariffs at a lower level than in Ukraine’s 
case. Although the GSP preferences extend to 
less than a fourth of total Ukrainian exports to 
the EU, the ration of their use by Ukraine is high: 
in 2010 it reached 72.2%, and the value of ex-
ports as part of the GSP stood at €2.15 billion29 
(the total export value being €9.94 billion30). 
27 ‘Most favoured nation’ status provides the country it is 
granted to with trade preferences in the form of low 
customs duties and/or high import quotas. These prefer-
ences may not be smaller than those offered to any oth-
er country which the country granting the status keeps 
trade relations with. 
28 Including machines, mechanical parts, chemical prod-
ucts, textiles, base metals and some plants.
29 Data as provided by the Directorate General for Trade 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/
30 Data as provided by the International Monetary Fund. 
Action Plans, whose aims include bringing 
Ukrainian regulations closer to EU solutions, 
were introduced in 2004 as part of the Europe-
an Neighbourhood Policy. In 2009, the Actions 
Plans were replaced with the Association Agen-
da, which is a transitional European integration 
instrument, applicable until a new Association 
Agreement comes into force. 
Ukraine’s accession to the WTO in 2008 was an-
other step in trade liberalisation with the EU. 
Ukraine has reduced its customs tariffs on EU 
products and has gradually limited some export 
duties to the EU, among other measures. Pursu-
ant to the agreed schedule, Ukraine’s average 
customs tariffs in 2013 will be 5.1% (10.1% on 
agricultural products and 4.8% on industrial 
products)31.
The trade volume between the EU and Ukraine 
was growing regularly until 2009, when the 
financial crisis led to significant reductions in 
both Ukraine and the EU. In 2011, this value 
reached €36.17 billion, including EU exports to 
Ukraine totalling €21.2 billion, and imports of 
€15 billion. There is also a strong asymmetry 
in relations between these two parties. While 
the EU is Ukraine’s second largest partner after 
Russia (it accounted for 28.6% of the trade in 
2010), Ukraine is of low significance for the EU 
(the 22nd biggest trade partner, with just 1.1% 
share in trade)32.
31 ‘Costs and Benefits of FTA between Ukraine and the 
European Union’, Institute for Economic Research and 
Policy Consulting, Kyiv 2010, pp. 23.
32 Data on the basis of information from the Directorate 
General for Trade (as quoted by Eurostat and the IMF) 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/
tradoc_113459.pdf
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1. Value of trade between the EU and Ukraine (in billions of euros)
2. Ukraine’s share in the EU’s trade
Source: European Commission’s Directorate General for Trade (DG Trade) 
Source: European Commission’s Directorate General for Trade (DG Trade) and Eurostat
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3. The share of EU member states in Ukraine’s trade
Source: European Commission’s Directorate General for Trade (DG Trade) and the International Monetary Fund
Source: State Statistical Service of Ukraine (Ukrstat)
4. EU Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in Ukraine (US$ billions)
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